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Abstract 
 
In this paper I propose to look exclusively at the philosophical thought of Sartre and to situate 
it in relation to the wider European tradition and other thinkers, especially Heidegger.  The 
purpose arises from the general acceptance of Sartre’s philosophy in the British academic 
environment as an example of a contradictory account of freedom and human nature.  Such a 
reading, I shall contend, is based on a mistaken appropriation of Sartre’s concept of existence 
which has been divorced from its origins in the modern European tradition and the over-
determination of the meaning of freedom as uncaused spontaneity.  To look at Sartre without 
reference to his influences such as Kant, Hegel and Heidegger and without considering his 
later works is the reason that this prevalent, mistaken reading is still accepted in many 
quarters. 
§1| Introduction1 
 
Sartre’s account of freedom is still widely understood as a version of metaphysical 
libertarianism, a doctrine which asserts that the human being is completely and 
unconditionally free.  This prevalent reading is largely due to the influence still held by Mary 
Warnock’s interpretation of his early texts and her privilege of the role of anguish in his 
thought.2  The true doctrine of Sartrean philosophy is, according to this position, the idea that 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally published in 2003 in Sartre Studies International, 9(1), 1-20. Reprinted by kind 
permission of the publishers, Berghahn Books. 
2 M. Warnock, The Philosophy of Sartre, London: Hutchinson and Co., 1965  (Hereafter PS)  Her book is the most 
comprehensively argued account of Sartre’s libertarianism and this “traditional” Sartrean freedom can also be 
found in W. Desan, The Tragic Finale New York: Harper, 1960 and S. Morgenbesser and J. Walsh, Free Will 
Englewood Clifts: Prentice-Hall, 1962.  It is appropriated unreflectively by non-Sartrean scholars – see, for 
example, J. Neu, “Divided Minds: Sartre’s “Bad Faith” critique of Freud” in Review of Metaphysics 1988, 42, 79-
101.  It also causes confusion in Sartrean scholars, see J. Simont, “Sartrean Ethics” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Sartre Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, and forces P. Caws to completely separate the freedom 
of spontaneity and freedom of action as though they were distinct phenomena in ch. 8 of Sartre London: 
 
 
man is absolutely and unconditionally free and that determinism is false.  This leads to a 
tension in Being and Nothingness between, on the one hand, the self as an uncaused and 
ultimately meaningless spontaneity; and, on the other, an account of human nature as the 
original project.  Warnock accuses Sartre of resolving this tension in his later works by 
betraying freedom and re-introducing determinism into his account of human nature, namely 
Marxist historical materialism.  Her book makes it possible to speak of an early and a late 
Sartre; the existentialist, and the Marxist. 
However, this approach over-determines the meaning of freedom in Sartre’s texts as 
uncaused spontaneity when it is possible to offer an alternative interpretation by returning to 
the anachronistic idea of human nature.  Sartre openly states that “there is no human nature” 
(EH 29), but this is to be understood in terms of his whole presentation of human freedom 
and not just in relation to his rejection of determinism.3 The aim of this paper is not to deny 
the libertarianism inherent in Sartre’s account, but to argue that it is but the most basic level 
on which a more sophisticated account of free-will is erected.  An examination of the influence 
of the German idealist tradition and, especially, Heidegger on Sartre’s ideas, will hopefully 
demonstrate the importance of the notion of freedom as self-determination. 
§2| Sartre’s libertarianism 
 
Most interpretations of Sartre’s work begin from his contribution to the freedom-
determinism debate: of the three characters in the debate – that is, the determinist, the 
compatibilist and the libertarian – Sartre offers his readers the most extreme and consistent 
account of the libertarian position.  The determinist holds that the human being is a physical 
object like all others, subject to the physical laws of the universe and, once all the laws are 
known and the initial conditions revealed, the human being is as predictable in his or her 
behaviour as a billiard ball.  Free-will is merely an illusion.  The compatibilist agrees that man 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Routledge, 1979.  For a good overview of the whole problem of defining Sartrean freedom, refer to D. Detmar, 
Freedom as a Value Chicago: Open Court, 1986. 
3 Abbreviations to the works of Sartre are as follows: TE - The Transcendence of the Ego (1936) trans. F. Williams, 
and R. Kirkpatrick, New York: Octagon Books, 1972; N - Nausea (1938) trans. R. Baldick, London: Penguin, 1965; 
BN - Being and Nothingness (1943)trans. H. Barnes, London: Routledge, 1989 AJ – Anti-Semite and Jew (1944) 
trans. G. Becker, New York: Schoken Books, 1948; EH - Existentialism and Humanism (1945) trans. P. Mairet, 
London: Methuen, 1987; CF - “Cartesian Freedom” (1947) in Literary and Philosophical Essays trans. A. 
Michelson, London: Hutchinson, 1968; NE – Notebooks for an Ethics (1947-8) trans. D. Pellauer, London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992; SM – The Search for a Method (1960) trans. H. Barnes, London: Methuen, 
1963; CDR – The Critique of Dialectical Reason vol. 1 (1960) trans. A. Sheridan-Smith, London: Verso, 1991. 
 
 
is subject to causal law since he is motivated by desires, but that freedom is the power to 
satisfy desire and so one ought to understand freedom as freedom from restraint.  For the 
libertarian, the human being is free because he can choose his own values and projects.  
Human beings and objects are just different types of things; humans are able to determine 
their own actions through an act of volition which is uncaused.4  Sartre is the proper name 
most commonly associated with the position of the libertarian as he rejects any deterministic 
theory of action and, equally, he does not accept compatibilism: if freedom means uncaused, 
to describe freedom as acting on one’s desires without impediment is to say one’s action is 
caused by a desire or a personality trait. (BN 433-442)  To be free is to reject all possible 
explanations of knowing, doing or being which refer to something prior and external to 
consciousness. 
The above account of freedom can be found most clearly in The Transcendence of the 
Ego and, at that stage, Sartre was concerned with capturing, not defining, the nature of 
metaphysical freedom, that is the essence of consciousness.  It is in Being and Nothingness that 
the moral consequences of his extreme libertarianism begin to be felt with regard to 
responsibility.  In asking for what things am I responsible, the agent asks himself of all the 
events in the world which can I claim as “mine.”  A very unsophisticated determinist would 
answer absolutely nothing: the agent is nothing more than a complicated billiard ball.  The 
compatibilist would answer: all those acts which are motivated by my own desires.  Both 
accounts, of course, have their problems: the former because it seems to negate far too much 
of our actual experience, the latter because it cannot explain why we conceive of coercion as a 
case of unfree action. 
 
Sartre, though, would respond by saying that the agent is responsible for every act 
(and one must remember that knowing, too, is a species of acting for Sartre).  One cannot 
claim that “I couldn’t help it”, “That’s just the way I am” or “It’s my duty” in order to negate 
one’s personal responsibility for what one has done.  Any attempt to avoid responsibility, to 
deny one’s freedom, is bad faith and this is the morality that lies at the heart of Being and 
Nothingness.  Bad faith is a denial of freedom, a denial of who we are, it is to deny the very 
dignity of humanity.  The realisation that the agent is solely responsible for his acts leads to 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive overview of all these positions, refer to G. Watson, (ed.) Free Will Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982. 
 
 
anguish, the dread of being free, and it is this revelation which Warnock takes to be so 
significant in Sartre’s work.  Anguish captures the nature of the human being condemned to 
be free, knowing that he must decide and choose and that these choices are his and his alone. 
 
Yet, it is this extreme libertarianism which gives rise to the paradox of freedom.  
Responsibility was defined as those events which originate from “me” and a compatibilist is 
able to describe an empirical self, a personality or storehouse of desires, and restructure the 
object “me” which is in the world.  The libertarian, of course, rejects any causal relationship 
between an empirical self and action.  When the libertarian says that “I chose to x” what is the 
object which can stand in for the “I”?   
 
One could, perhaps, follow the libertarianism of Kant and equate the unity of “I” with 
the rational self as opposed to the phenomenal self: the agent is responsible when he acts 
from reasons rather than when he is motivated by empirical causes such as desires.5  
However, the extreme nature of Sartre’s libertarianism can be heard in these words: “… the 
root of all Reason is to be sought in the depths of the free act.” (CF 183; see also BN 570) Kant, 
after all, talks of two different orders of causality, one of reason and one of the phenomenal 
world.  If one were capable of understanding the principles of reason, then the right action 
could be predicted.  This is to replace the free agent with reason and it is not the agent who 
chooses but reason itself.  For Sartre, this is akin to positing a law of consciousness which is 
absurd.  A law of consciousness would be known by a consciousness and, if it is known by a 
consciousness, then that consciousness is prior to it. (BN xxvi-xxxii) 
 
Sartre, then, absolutely rejects all forms of causality, including the differentiation of the 
self into rational and phenomenal, à la Kant.  It is the spontaneous nature of consciousness 
which makes room for a coherent notion of choice: for a choice to be mine and mine alone, it 
must not arise from a prior character, from a given desire, form the way the world is or was, 
or, finally, from the dictates of reason.  For a choice to be authentic and free the agent must 
negate these constraints and consciousness has to be spontaneous.  And here is the problem: 
if the choice is spontaneous, is it not better understood as an event since the “I” which chooses 
                                                 
5 This is a very unsatisfactory account of Kant’s picture, but it serves its purpose here.  For the full account, see 
The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals trans. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
 
is nothingness and not identical with the empirical ego which is “me”?  What is the difference 
between this uncaused event and choosing an ice-cream by lottery, that is placing my hand in 
a bucket of tickets with flavours written on them and picking one?6 Perhaps one can say in an 
absurd universe, there is no difference, but then Sartre has to explain the phenomenon of 
anguish differently, for if the “me” of “my” choice is nothingness, then who is responsible and 
who feels anguish?  Who is the self which connects all the acts as mine?  Freedom understood 
in this manner seems to lose its relationship to responsibility which is crucial for the 
experience of anguish. 
 
Being and Nothingness is Sartre’s attempt to offer a resolution to this problem because 
the subject is no longer a metaphysical abstraction employed to reveal the structures of being 
human (as it was in the earlier works), but it is characterised as a particular person living in 
the world. (BN 3)  And what defines a person as opposed to an isolated consciousness is 
simply continuity over time: this series of acts is “me.”  Thus, Being and Nothingness, in its 
introduction and first two parts, revises and elaborates the account of metaphysical freedom 
Sartre had already described in the earlier works.  In parts three and four, he begins to offer 
an answer to the problem of continuity: the original project is a universal, fundamental 
structure of being human.  The original project dictates that each act has a meaning in relation 
to a consciousness which is constructing itself in the face of other consciousnesses (being-for-
others). 
 
Warnock describes the original project as man’s desire to possess others and the world, 
but these are only manifestations of a deeper structure.  Why is it that consciousness seeks to 
possess other consciousnesses and the world?  In order to be something and not nothing; in 
order to be fixed, essential and free of anguish; in order to be what it is not.  Sartre’s own 
description bears this out: 
The goal in short is to overtake that being which flees itself while being what it is in 
the mode of not-being and which flows on while being its own flow, which escapes 
between its own fingers; the goal is to make of it a given, a given which finally is 
what it is; the problem is to gather together in a unity of one this unachieved 
                                                 
6 Sartre himself is well aware of this.  He criticises libertarianism as gratuitous on pp. 436-437 of BN, but 
muddles it somewhat with compatibilism. 
 
 
totality which is unachieved only because it is to itself its own non-achievement, to 
escape from the sphere of perpetual reference which has to be a reference to itself, 
and – precisely because it has escaped from the chains of this reference to itself – 
to make it be as a seen reference – that is, a reference which is what it is. (BN 153) 
Continuity or personality is postulated in an account of human nature which Sartre believes is 
consistent with his description of consciousness: to found oneself as that being which is 
recognisably free through a series of acts that demonstrate this undeniably to the other.  The 
metaphysical freedom of The Transcendence of the Ego becomes a practical freedom of the 
person in situation: 
Human reality can not receive its ends, as we have seen, either from outside or 
from so-called inner “nature”.  It chooses them and by this very choice confers 
upon them a transcendent existence as the external limits of its projects.  From this 
point of view – and if it is understood that the existence of Dasein precedes and 
commands its essence – human reality in and through its very upsurge decides to 
define its own being by its ends.  It is therefore the positing of my ultimate ends 
which characterizes my being and which is identical with the sudden thrust of 
freedom which is mine. (BN 443)7 
 
It is at this point in the description of being human that Warnock poses her famous 
challenge: Sartre has created an unacceptable tension between, on the one hand, freedom as 
uncaused spontaneity and, on the other, a universal account of human nature.  No matter how 
thin this general theory of man is, according to her, Sartre is guilty of reintroducing an essence 
into man’s being and contradicting his own condition of freedom: 
What can be meant by saying that we choose ourselves, or that we choose how to 
live in our peculiar circumstances and situation, if we are committed, by being 
human, to a general pattern of behaviour such as Sartre has described?  Sartre 
accuses Freud of denying human freedom by basing his method of analysis of 
human behaviour on the supposition that we are determined by our past 
experiences to behave as we do.  But his method of analysis, in so far as it has any 
definite basis at all, must rest on the equally deterministic assumption that we 
                                                 
7 This passage continues: “And this thrust is an existence; it has nothing to do with an essence or with a property 
of a being which would be engendered conjointly with an idea.”  This distinction between existence and being 
will become significant as the reader will soon see. 
 
 
form the projects we do because of our commitment to possess others and the 
world. (PS 126) 
And how was this tension to be resolved?  The standard interpretation states that Sartre 
negated the freedom of the particular individual for his account of human nature which was to 
eventually embody Marxist doctrine.  Sartre betrayed his existentialist roots in order to make 
his account consistent: there is an early Sartre – the existentialist and the exponent of an 
extreme (if contradictory) libertarianism – and a late Sartre who reveals the problems with 
that position and opts for Marxism instead. 
§3| The alternative reading: a Heideggerean Sartre 
 
It is possible to offer an alternative, equally plausible interpretation of Sartrean freedom 
which retains the concept’s centrality in his work, but also proposes continuity between the 
psychological and sociological levels of meaning.  The established schism in Sartre’s thought is 
most comprehensively championed in Warnock’s book and a couple of general statements 
made there are extremely revealing.  First, for all her continued references to Sartre’s anti-
Cartesianism, her book often works against this overall interpretation, relying too heavily on a 
parallel between the two thinkers: “Sartre, like all French philosophers, treats Descartes as 
the father of the subject, and “Cogito ergo sum”, Descartes” supposedly indubitable foundation 
for his whole system, as somehow containing the germ of all truth within itself.” (PS 13) This 
is true, but, for Sartre, “Cogito ergo sum” is understood as “We must begin from the 
subjective.” (EH 26)  It is only to assert that the explanation of any phenomenon must include 
and be grounded in the consciousness of that phenomenon.  For there to be phenomena, one 
must be experiencing and if one is experiencing, one exists.  This is a familiar transcendental 
argument that, for Sartre, proves that if there is consciousness, then there must exist a pre-
reflective cogito, which is consciousness of being conscious of x.  This falls far short of 
Descartes’ mind or thinking substance and, yet, Warnock manages to mistakenly allow a 
latent dualism to corrupt her presentation of Sartre’s theory of mind: “The duality of mind and 
body, of physical thing and mental thing, is essential to human beings and determines their 
behaviour in many ways.  For other people I am, at first and immediately, a Being-in-itself.  
For myself I am, naturally, a Being-for-itself.  And together these two modes of being combine 
to define the third mode – Being-for-others.” (PS 66-7)  This quotation contains obvious 
errors: one, it is not clear that first and immediately I am a being-in-itself for others.  Others 
 
 
are immediately and pre-reflectively different from being-in-itself for Sartre.  More 
significantly, there is no dualism in Sartre’s thought between thinking substance and physical 
substance.  There is only Being and consciousness and the two do not form a duality because 
consciousness is nothingness.  It is a strange duality indeed which holds that there are two 
types of things in the world, one which is being and the other which is nothing.  Also, if the 
dualism is constituted by being-for-itself and being-in-itself, how then is one supposed to 
comprehend the third mode: being-for-others?  Warnock does not explicitly call Sartre a 
dualist, but the implication is latent in her interpretation.  Unfortunately, the interpretation 
became standard and being-for-itself and being-in-itself were conveniently mapped on to 
mind and body. 
 
Any alternative reading of Sartre’s account of subjectivity has to return to the 
relationship between these concepts and their anti-Cartesian origin.  A parenthetical 
comment by Warnock reveals why her reading may be inadequate: 
(I shall not, incidentally, say anything at all about the origins of these expressions 
or their history in Hegelian and German idealist philosophy in general.  Sartre 
owes a very great deal to Hegel, and also to Heidegger.  But these philosophers are 
themselves so exceedingly obscure that more would be lost than gained in trying 
to trace the debts and the corruptions, the likenesses and the differences, which 
are, however, certainly there to be traced by anyone who has the patience to 
undertake it.) (PS 42)8 
Warnock’s mistake resides in refusing to think through these connections since it is easy to 
frame Sartre as a dualist if one thinks of these concepts as entities rather than as modes of 
being.  Consciousness comports itself – that is, behaves – towards being and this is crucial to 
understanding his anti-Cartesianism which – in Being and Nothingness – is derived largely 
from Heidegger.  More significantly, Sartre’s anti-Cartesianism explains why he assumes that 
he can offer an account of freedom which is compatible with a universal structure of human 
being. 
 
                                                 
8 She is even more revealing when she states: “I confess to finding Heidegger both unintelligible and 
unattractive…” p. 71. 
 
 
The first departure for an existentialism is to hold existence precedes essence: any 
knowledge at all (any relationship with being) is only possible if there is a subject.  This is a 
familiar transcendental argument which one finds in Kant: the unity of apperception is proven 
by the fact that moments of consciousness must have an a priori unity otherwise synthesis 
would not be possible.9  It is in Heidegger’s thought that the unity of apperception, which for 
Kant is derived from knowledge, becomes ontologically prior.10  If there exists an a priori 
unity, surely the way in which this exists determines the objects of experience and any 
ontology or metaphysics must begin with this: each different entity has a different way of 
being known, it is characterised differently due to the subject’s behaviour towards it.  
Although I say “I know myself”, “I know Paul” and “I know that is a table” with the same verb, 
what I am doing – and knowing is a type of doing – is different in each case.  The modes of 
being Sartre describes are derived from this approach. 
 
Dasein – Heidegger’s substitution for the Cartesian Cogito and the Kantian unity of 
apperception – is constituted by three knowing relationships.  (1) Dasein is concerned about 
things, they matter because they can either fulfil or frustrate its projects or desires.  This is to 
know things as either ready-to-hand or, in a more reified sense, as present-at-hand.  Thus, the 
way in which Dasein exists – its projects, aspirations and motivations – are prior to 
knowledge of these entities.  This, of course, loosely corresponds to Sartre’s being-in-itself, or 
rather being-in-itselfs.11  (2) Dasein is with-others in a relationship of solicitude: we share a 
world with other consciousnesses who also exist as projects, structuring the world as a matrix 
for-themselves.  This loosely corresponds to Sartre’s being-for-others, but Sartre is – in Being 
and Nothingness – pessimistic about the possibility of authentic recognition by others and 
                                                 
9 For Kant’s full argument, see his “Transcendental Deduction” in part two of the Analytic in Critique of Pure 
Reason trans. J. Meiklejohn, (revised by V. Politis) London: Everyman, 1993.  Basically, for knowledge as the 
synthesis of assertions to be possible, it must be presupposed that these moments all belong to the same 
knowing self-consciousness (the unity of apperception): (I know) that all men are mortal; (I know) Socrates was 
a man; Therefore, (I know) Socrates was mortal.  The I has to be identical through all these moments.  If Bill 
knows exclusively that all men are mortal and Bob knows exclusively Socrates was a man, neither would be able 
to reach the conclusion of the syllogism on their own. 
10 Dasein is ontologically prior to entities, but not Being itself.  Sartre denies that the for-itself in ontologically 
prior to the in itself (BN, p. 619) but this actually underlines a confusion in his work.  Sartre uses being-in-itself 
in an equivocal way: to refer to Being and to entities, he should perhaps talk about Being-in-itself and beings-in-
themselves, though he often uses “being-in-itselfs.” 
11 See footnote 10.  The reason why nausea is my way of knowing is because it refers to Being in itself.  The 
nearest emotional comportment to being-in-itself would be the coefficient of adversity. 
 
 
replaces Heidegger’s picture with a more antagonistic one, hence solicitude is substituted by 
shame.  (3) Finally, Dasein cares about itself.  It is immediately related to itself as that which 
cares who it is, what it does, and who it becomes.  This is the immediate way in which one can 
understand Sartre’s being-for-itself and again his emotional characterisation is more prosaic: 
anguish.12 
 
Of these three modes of consciousness, of knowing, the two which most closely map on 
to Sartre’s account are concern and care.  Heidegger says that it is pertinent and useful to 
apply the verb “to be” to being-in-itself and the verb “to exist” to being-for-itself, since the 
former answers the question “What is it?” and the latter answers the question “Who is it?13  
Common to both is Dasein, without Dasein there would be no knowing, yet knowing in each 
case is a different type of behaviour.  One commits an ontological error, for Heidegger, when 
one attempts to know consciousness as a “what” rather than a “who”14 Cartesianism commits 
this error as does any account of human nature given in terms apt to a “what” rather than a 
“who”, that is attempts to describe the human subject in terms of properties or as a thing 
present-at-hand with a fixed, eternal essence. 
 
Who, then, is Dasein?  Dasein is that which endures through the fleeting moments of 
consciousness in order to synthesise it and when we wish to characterise this synthesis it 
amounts to nothing more than a totalised system of moments of consciousness.  It is self-
determination as a structure of existence: I exist as my possibilities, or as Heidegger 
characterises it: “I myself am mine.” (BT ¶13)  Whereas, entities are determined from without 
by the projection of Dasein, Dasein projects itself.  The structure of the pre-reflective 
consciousness makes itself an object but can never grasp itself. (BT ¶25)  This entails that it is 
impossible to understand it as an object or as an essence (a what), one has to comprehend it 
as an existence, as a way of being (a who).  Sartre appropriates Heidegger’s insights in his 
                                                 
12 For Heidegger, of course, anguish/anxiety is an ontic form of care, just as care is an ontic form of being-
towards-death.  See Being and Time trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992 ¶¶39-42; 51-
53.  (Hereafter BT.) 
13 Sartre’s own equivalent can be found in BN 25 and 123. 
14 It is an equal error to try to know a table as a “who”.  One way to crystallise Heidegger’s point is when one uses 
scientific concepts to explain a work of art.  They are just not apt.  In G. McCulloch, Using Sartre London: 
Routledge, 1994 p. 57, the author feels compelled to distinguish “to BE” from “to be”, but makes no mention of 
the roots of this in existentialism. 
 
 
presentation of being-for-itself, which then becomes his equivalent for the Kantian unity of 
apperception.  There has to exist an a priori unity of consciousness otherwise this particular 
moment of consciousness would be impossible and this a priori unity makes possible the 
empirical, synthetic unity which is me in the world. (BN 103)  The original project is the 
attempt by self-consciousness on the part of itself to make itself identical with its unifying 
process which is impossible, but necessary since it is its essential structure: 
There is an indivisible, indissoluble being – definitely not a substance supporting 
its qualities like particles of being, but a being which is existence through and 
through…  This is what Heidegger expressed very well when he wrote (though 
speaking of Dasein, not of consciousness): “The “how” (essentia) of this being, so 
far as it is possible to speak of it generally, must be conceived in terms of its 
existence (existentia).”  This means that consciousness is not produced as a 
particular instance of an abstract possibility but that in rising to the center of 
being, it creates and supports its essence – that is, the synthetic order of its 
possibilities. (BN xxxi)15 
 
Warnock understands Sartre’s for-itself as an essence like the Cartesian cogito, when it 
should most properly be understood as an existence.  She commits an ontological error when 
she assumes that the original project is an account of human nature as a “what”.  If the human 
being is a “what”, a thing present-at-hand, then one can apply the category of causality to it 
and the paradox of freedom arises.  However, Sartre is describing the “who”, the fundamental 
way in which human-being exists in the world.  In other words, the metaphysical account of 
the for-itself is being applied to the situation.  Warnock’s reading is dependent on the account 
of The Transcendence of the Ego and the first third of Being and Nothingness being 
extrapolated into a social situation, whereas Sartre is offering an account of how such a 
metaphysical entity exists in a social situation.  He is moving his description from the abstract 
level to the concrete level.   
 
The supposed tension in Sartre’s text between a universal account of human nature and 
his account of uncaused freedom rests on this ontological error.  It is to describe the subject in 
terms of a thing when Sartre repeatedly asserts that it is nothing.  The original project needs 
                                                 
15 Sartre also offers an aesthetic way to understand this unity, see N 252 and TE 73-74. 
 
 
to be understood as a fuller elaboration of self-consciousness’s knowledge of itself.  Things 
are, that is, have, essences: a table is x, y, z. Self-consciousness exists, that is, is free.  How do I 
know myself as freedom?  I know I am in anguish, that this anguish reveals that I want to 
negate my possibilities and become a thing which is free.  The original project is an 
elaboration of who we are and a description of the way we know ourselves and deal with our 
freedom.  Freedom is, after all, the futile pursuit of essence, of a negation trying to negate 
itself. 
 
To describe Sartre as a libertarian is misleading because the spontaneous nature of 
consciousness is not the essence of freedom, but the pre-condition of choice.  The freedom of 
consciousness is indeterminism and this indeterminism guarantees the notion of choice.16  In 
order for choice to be meaningful, this freedom has to be elaborated more fully as self-
determination or the idea of personal freedom: “Thus from its first arising, consciousness by 
the pure nihilating movement of reflection makes itself personal; for what confers personal 
existence on a being is not the possession of an Ego – which is only the sign of a personality – 
but it is the fact that the being exists for itself as presence to itself.” (BN 103; see also EH 29)  I 
am free when I am the one who chooses the content of my will, when I act on my volitions and 
not those imposed on me from without.  The original project cannot be understood in terms of 
freedom if this means only uncaused, but it is a good characterisation of the human condition 
if freedom as self-determination is a fundamental structure of the self, especially if the one 
who exists, exists in an absurd universe.  Each of my acts fills me with being for which I am 
responsible, yet this “me” can always be negated, always be overcome and “I”, too, am 
responsible for this fact.  Sartre’s conception of self-determination is unique and original 
because it embodies the “necessity of contingency”: it is necessary that I determine myself but 
any determination is contingent since it has no ultimate meaning. (BN 327)  My being refers 
only to me and this is the impossible burden of responsibility that gives rise to anguish. 
 
                                                 
16 Such an assertion can once more be traced back to German Idealism and Hegel.  See Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right trans. H. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 §§5 and 7.  There is another story to be 
told about Hegel’s influence on Sartre, but it is a much more subtle and reflective engagement on the latter’s part 
than his appropriation of Heidegger’s approach.  It is thus a story which requires a more general investigation 
than a brief article can offer. 
 
 
Sartre’s account of the original project is not exactly an account of human nature as 
Warnock supposes, it is a characterisation of the human condition, of being human.  To read 
the original project as having a causal relationship with the particular acts of the individual is 
to apply a category which is mistaken.  Acts are not determined, things present-at-hand are 
determined (this is, at least, one of their possible ways to be) whereas acts are an expression 
of being-for-itself, they are self-determined.   
§4| Whose reading? 
 
Given the length and style of Being and Nothingness, it would be possible to identify 
passages which supported one or other of the readings elaborated above.  It is, therefore, 
more pertinent to point to general ways in which the Heideggerean reading might offer a 
better understanding of Sartre’s philosophical canon.  I shall do this in two ways: first, by 
demonstrating that the paradox of freedom and the supposed tension within Being and 
Nothingness is resolved without ceding either the notion of consciousness as spontaneity or 
the fundamental structure of the project. (§§4.1 and 4.2) Second, I shall question Warnock’s 
explicit accusation that the sociological concepts of Sartre’s later works do not grow out of, 
but rather negate, his earlier psychological concepts. (§5) 
§4.1| Warnock’s charge of determinism 
 
Sartre’s extreme libertarianism committed him to describing consciousness as uncaused 
spontaneity, but to describe an act as “mine” means nothing unless there exists “me” which 
can be identified as the cause of that act.  Therefore, in order to justify his own account of 
anguish and responsibility, Sartre offered a universal account of being human which operates 
by creating a unity of self.  Acts are not gratuitous but are to be understood in terms of an 
ongoing project to be in-itself-for-itself.  This clearly brings in the second sense of freedom as 
self-determination: “Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of 
man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be.” (BN 440; see also 23, 34-
5)  Sartre then sets himself the task of applying his account of the human condition to 
particular cases and it is in doing this that he sees the possibility of an existentialist psycho-
analysis.  This is supposedly where Warnock’s criticism bites deepest: 
 
 
Of course, it may truly be said that absolutely any method of analysis, if it is 
designed to explain human behaviour in terms other than superficial or common-
sense terms, must do so in the light of some general theory.  This is what such an 
explanation consists in.  And there cannot be a general theory of human nature 
which does not commit its holder to some general views about how human beings 
necessarily behave.  And so from the very outset Sartre, as well as Freud and any 
one else who undertakes the task of analysis, is committed to a certain degree of 
determinism. (PS 126-7) 
Acts, according to Warnock, cannot be absolutely free because they are caused by the general 
human desire to be in-itself-for-itself.  However, her reading only works if the “human” is 
rather than exists, which is to say, the human is a thing like a chair or a bottle with properties 
and/or tendencies.  Only because this is to think of a human in terms of what Heidegger calls a 
thing present-at-hand is it possible to apply those categories (such as causality) which one 
applies to chairs, bottles, et cetera. 
 
If it is true that Sartre is proposing a description of the human as a thing, then his 
proposal is useless since it serves little or no use as an explanatory theory.  Warnock is aware 
of this, citing it as a reason why Freud’s account of analysis is more satisfying, since his theory 
can explain actions whereas Sartrean analysis cannot.  Any general theory needs to be able to 
make predictions which either support or falsify the theory.  Freudian analysis can ideally 
investigate the particular details of an individual’s life (the initial conditions), add in some 
general desires from its account of human nature (universal laws) and generate a range of 
predictions.  It is obviously far more complicated than this ideal presentation, but it is 
possible.  The Sartrean analyst can only predict that freedom will be expressed in a general 
project to be in-itself-for-itself; that is, he predicts nothing.17 
 
Sartre was no fool.  Warnock’s charge of determinism just does not hold water because 
if one takes Sartre’s account of human nature as an explanatory theory, it is useless.  The 
general theory of the in-itself-for-itself has to be serving an alternative role in Sartre’s 
complete picture.  Warnock’s challenge only applies if one assumes consciousness is a being 
                                                 
17 It has been suggested to me that Sartre’s long biographies demonstrate the explanatory power of his theory.  
The problem is, I feel, that we are running together the ideas of strong, causal explanation and comprehension; 
that is, rendering intelligible.  For Warnock’s charge to stand, she has to assume the stronger explanatory case. 
 
 
present-at-hand, a thing with properties and tendencies, but that is the domain of being-in-
itself and not for-itself.  Sartre begins Being and Nothingness by resisting epistemological 
primacy: one cannot know anything about consciousness without being it.  In other words, 
one’s existence precedes essence since one exists as the possibility to transcend the given and 
posit oneself as what is not  Sartre is, on one level, a libertarian because consciousness is 
uncaused spontaneity and it is this rupture with determinism which makes room for a 
meaningful account of personal freedom.  Yet, this metaphysical freedom is the most basic 
description of the phenomenon and not Sartrean freedom per se as Warnock seems to suggest.  
Spontaneous consciousness is the conditional possibility of self-determination which is the 
proper characterisation of the human condition. 
 
Therefore, the original project described in Being and Nothingness is not a general 
theory of human behaviour, it is a description of human existence.  Given that self-conscious 
beings exist as freedom, how is an a priori unity of identity which grounds the synthetic unity 
of the person possible?  One, through self-determination: for consciousness to be self-
consciousness it must exist freely through the moments of consciousness.  Two, the existence 
of other consciousnesses is an immediate structure of my being (self-consciousness is 
immediately aware of its being-for-others or, again, it would be only consciousness without 
identity) and, as such, I structure “me” as an object for the evaluation of the other.  Three, self-
consciousness then desires to be a unity open to evaluation, my a priori identity is structured 
as the attempt to create a synthetic unity (the project).  The purpose of the second half of 
Being and Nothingness is, then, an attempt to answer this question: given this universal 
condition of being human, how are we to understand this particular, synthetic totality (and 
here one could substitute a proper name: Pierre, Laura)?  Sartre is concerned in Being and 
Nothingness to descend from the level of abstraction to concreteness: to show the relationship 
between self-consciousness as it exists for-itself as isolated, metaphysical freedom and self-
consciousness as it exists in the world.  The original project characterises the way in which 
self-consciousness exists in the world and not, as Warnock supposes, a way in which we are 
(as, say, the table is brown or a lion is dangerous). 
§4.2| The three forms of bad faith 
 
 
 
Bad faith is a possible way in which the for-itself can exist.  It is an attempt to deny the 
contingency of actions due to some source of meaning prior to choice.  The for-itself denies 
responsibility for who it is and what it has made of itself.  In Being and Nothingness, bad faith 
takes three forms: (1) the belief that I am determined by my facticity: the agent assumes that 
essential, fixed properties limit his possibilities and explain his actions.  (2) The belief that I 
exist most authentically as transcendence, that no matter what you describe as “me”, I can 
negate it.  I can negate all my facticity, because I am free.  This form of bad faith implicitly 
denies my being-for-others which is an essential structure of freedom; that is, existing in the 
world.  (3) Finally, the “spirit of seriousness” or binding oneself to a purpose: I am a 
communist, I am a Christian and my role dictates certain obligations which derive from 
something external to me.  This is described as another way to try and fulfil my project 
without the anguish of choosing for myself because, as a part of a general movement, my 
choices are limited by the dictates of that movement. 
 
It is commonly supposed that Sartre’s authentic self-consciousness and the self-
consciousness of bad faith map snugly on to Heidegger’s own authentic and inauthentic 
Dasein.  Dasein, like Sartre’s for-itself, has always made some choice about being the way it is 
(it is responsible for its own facticity) and this choice is authentic when it chooses for itself 
and inauthentic when it is chosen for. (BT ¶¶9, 27 and 38)  Yet, if Sartre’s own distinction is 
supposed to map neatly on this, a problem immediately arises.  The first form of bad faith, 
where I consider myself a thing with properties, is not a case of inauthenticity in Heidegger’s 
sense.  Rather, it is to commit an ontological error: one is using categories and descriptions 
which are simply not apt and any conclusion which is generated will be inapplicable.  Sartre, 
though, is more astute than Heidegger – perhaps because Being and Nothingness is 
anthropology and not a preparatory work for ontology – because he recognises that this 
ontological error is a way in which self-consciousness often exists.  Warnock accuses Sartre of 
this very error in his description of the original project, but if the human did not exist as a 
project, then bad faith would not be possible.  Bad faith is to think of oneself as a thing with 
properties and it would be strange if Sartre contradicted himself so brazenly.18 
 
                                                 
18 Oddly enough this is Heidegger’s own criticism of Sartre – and any humanism – because it describes a human 
as a what rather than a who.  See his “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings D. Krell (ed.), London: Routledge, 
1993. 
 
 
Similarly, the second form of bad faith is puzzling if it is considered with Heidegger’s 
distinction in mind.  It is also an ontological error because it is to deny who one is – an 
existence in the world – and to misdescribe human being.  If Sartre is solely a libertarian, what 
sense is one supposed to make of the idea of revelling in transcendence as bad faith, when this 
is the very freedom which Warnock celebrates?  Self-determination is the acceptance of my 
own facticity and the situation within which I find myself in order to work it over, to make it 
truly mine.  (BN 489; SM 12-13) 
 
The final form of bad faith does neatly map on to Heidegger’s distinction and Sartre 
makes it explicitly moral: one ought not to live in bad faith, one ought to be authentic.  His aim 
in Being and Nothingness is not to tell us how to live, though.  Bad faith is only possible for a 
self-determining being and it allows us to discover those structures which constitute a self-
determining being.  However, within an absurd universe devoid of meaning and value, how is 
it possible to be authentic?  The opposite of bad faith is neither good faith nor sincerity, these 
are equally erroneous attitudes.  The opposite is, and here one hears an echo of Heidegger, 
authenticity. (BN 70fn)  However, there is little hope of an ethics of authenticity in Being and 
Nothingness because Sartre sees social being as wholly alienated, or any political project or 
collective movement as impossible.19  Yet, these are the very themes of the later works when 
he is attempting to extrapolate the psychological concepts into the sphere of sociology.   
 
In the bridge between Being and Nothingness and the Critique, Sartre defines the spirit of 
seriousness in these words: “The spirit of seriousness is voluntary alienation, that is, 
submission to an abstraction that justifies one: the thought that man is the inessential and the 
abstract the essential.” (NE 60) The alienation is voluntary, that is free in the sense of self-
determined, and therefore authentic.  Where the spirit of seriousness fails is in the rejection of 
the particular and the individual in favour of the duties of some impersonal, abstract entity.  
This is the very premise which Sartre will begin the Critique from, that is the need to marry 
existentialist subjectivism with Marxist historicism.  Being and Nothingness is not a failure, it 
is incomplete as Sartre himself acknowledges: “… what is impossible at the level of the For-
itself and the Project (the ontological organisation of a We) becomes real on the 
anthropological level of some common work.” (NE 130)  The incomplete nature of Being and 
                                                 
19 In BN Sartre hints at some authentic attitudes, viz. shame and arrogance (not pride), see 290 and also AJ 90. 
 
 
Nothingness resides in its consideration of an isolated individual existing in the world, but the 
third form of bad faith points explicitly towards the need for a sociological and political 
understanding of man.  Ignoring the continuity between the early psychological concepts and 
the later sociological ones only serves to exaggerate Warnock’s supposed contradiction 
between the idea of freedom and the project. 
§5| Is there continuity or rupture in Sartre’s thought? 
 
By placing a privilege on Sartre’s early works and especially on the metaphysical 
freedom of consciousness, Warnock, firstly, sees an inconsistency in Sartre’s thought between 
his supposed indeterminism and a deterministic account of human nature; and, secondly, 
produces a contradiction between her interpretation of freedom and Sartre’s own discussion 
of bad faith.  However, if one understands personal freedom as self-determination, a freedom 
made possible by the metaphysical reality of a spontaneous consciousness but not identical to 
it, then these two problems dissipate.  This advantage in itself is arguably reason enough to 
accept this interpretation, but there is another aspect to it which affects our understanding of 
the earlier and the later Sartre.  Warnock treats them as two entities diametrically opposed to 
one another, and she is not the only one.20  However, the supposed rupture between pre and 
post Being and Nothingness rests on the very idea of freedom against which I have sought to 
argue.  By ignoring the idea of freedom as self-determination and any serious engagement 
with the later philosophical works, this reading becomes self-perpetuating. 
 
Uncaused spontaneity, or consciousness, is not identical with personal freedom (as 
Warnock supposes), but is a precondition of it.  This reading allows one to climb from a 
metaphysical account of freedom as indeterminism to an anthropological account of freedom 
as self-determination.  If this is the case, then this anthropological account of freedom must 
similarly be a pre-condition of a sociological account of freedom found in the pages of The 
Critique of Dialectical Freedom.  It would be unreasonable to adequately interrogate this 
hypothesis without beginning a new article, but I merely wish to show that the concepts in 
                                                 
20 See PS ch. 6.  In her camp one also needs to mention: G. Kline, “The Existentialist Rediscovery of Hegel and 
Marx” in N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (eds), Phenomenology and Existentialism Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1967.  Amongst those who think Sartre’s thought constitutes a continuity, see D. Detmar, 
Freedom as a Value op-cit., T. Flynn, Sartre and Marxist Existentialism London: University of Chicago Press, 1984 
and M. Grene, Sartre New York: New Viewpoints, 1973. 
 
 
play in Sartre’s political and sociological works are both dependent on and an extrapolation of 
freedom as self-determination in the same way that that idea is both dependent on and an 
extrapolation of an account of metaphysical indeterminism.   
 
Being and Nothingness does not fulfil the task of offering a complete set of 
methodological tools for comprehending the synthetic totality of the person – Sartre’s attempt 
at a fundamental psycho-analytic theory is incomplete and he only hints at the possibility of 
an ethics.  This deficiency is not, however, a failure because a full description of the person 
necessarily requires a sociology and an ethics.  In The Transcendence of the Ego and the 
beginning of Being and Nothingness, freedom is described from the metaphysical point of 
view.  Sartre is concerned with revealing the structures of freedom in isolation, thus freedom 
is primarily understood as uncaused spontaneity since this is consistent with the 
phenomenological approach adopted.  This description is a conditional possibility for a person 
to exist as a project and the idea of freedom as self-determination begins to take hold in parts 
3 and 4 of Being and Nothingness where Sartre turns his analysis to the significance of the 
situation and the subject’s facticity.  Later, in the Critique, history too will play a part. 
 
The progressive-regressive method is Sartre’s first attempt to truly complete his 
account of being human.  It remains a theory of human nature based upon the free 
transcendence of one’s situation (progressive), yet simultaneously realises that a particular 
project has to be understood as the negation of a particular situation, facticity or history.  As 
freedom is essentially the for-itself existing as being-for-others, then the way in which it will 
be free depends on its particular others and not some abstract, universal other.  With the 
progressive-regressive method, Sartre is trying to make his general account of being human 
applicable to the particular case: “The project has a meaning, it is not the simple negativity of 
flight; by it a man aims at the production of himself in the world as a certain objective 
totality.” (SM 147; see also SM 150-1)  Only within a social context, that is the actual 
structures of being-for-others, can freedom be meaningful rather than absurd.  (CDR 334) 
 
The progressive-regressive method can only be applicable to persons if the more 
fundamental description of human existence is projection.  Similarly, freedom within social 
reality is to be understood as praxis: 
 
 
… the “transcendence-immanence” of its members creates the possibility of the 
group as common action.  Pure immanence, indeed, would eliminate the practical 
organism in favour of a hyper-organism.  Or, quite simply, if it were possible for 
everyone to effect his own integration, every action, in so far as it was common, 
would lose any possibility of or reason for positing itself as a regulatory action and 
the group would no longer conceive itself in its praxis through innumerable 
refractions of the same operation.  In other words, the action would be blind, or 
would become inertia.  Pure transcendence, however, would shatter the practical 
community into molecules related only by bonds of exteriority and no one would 
recognise himself in the action or signal of some atomised individual. (CDR 409) 
This is the possibility of an ethics, the way in which one can commit oneself to a meaning 
without falling into the spirit of seriousness.  Sartre sets out the conditions of social freedom: 
it is not wholly immanent, for that would be Humean: to reason to one’s ends, but not to 
choose one’s ends (they would be chosen by the group).  Neither is it wholly transcendental 
(metaphysical freedom), for that would be ineffectual: to negate everything, is to negate even 
possibility.  These mirror the first two forms of bad faith.  Yet, social freedom is precarious 
unlike absolute freedom, it must ward off the ever present possibility of inertia, that is 
becoming the third form of bad faith, viz. the spirit of seriousness (or seriality).  In fact, the 
bad faith of the Critique maps neatly on to the authentic/inauthentic distinction that was 
described earlier: when historical necessity is able to furnish a complete explanation it does 
so through an ontological error in that the self is assumed to be substance and this myth is 
perpetuated by other freedoms (oppressing classes, the system solidified, etc.): freedom is 
still the only limit to my freedom.  The agent is in bad faith because he has not chosen himself, 
he is not his own product.  It is this very contradiction between how I exist (praxis) and what I 
am (the practico-inert) which fuels the movement towards the future.  The constant worry in 
the Critique that authentic praxis may become the pratico-inert arises from Sartre’s assertion 
that for freedom to be meaningful it has to occur in objective or historical structures.  
Freedom as self-determination remains at the heart of Sartre’s enterprise. (CDR 339-431) 
 
Without his psychological concepts, the basis of praxis as a sociological theory of action 
would be woefully incomplete.  More than any other, the idea of freedom as self-
determination is crucial in that the characterisation of praxis remains that I, as individual, am 
 
 
responsible for what I (and what we) make of myself (ourselves): it is because man can negate 
what is, because he is free to choose himself, that the negative conception of the world “it is 
impossible that there is no better society or way of things” provides the motor of change as an 
implicit “the world ought to be thus” in the future. (CDR 330)  The idea of freedom as self-
determination not only solves certain inconsistencies which arise if one shares Warnock’s 
belief that Sartre is a libertarian, it also dissolves the idea that he undergoes a radical 
conversion from existentialism to Marxism.  If one understands freedom as self-
determination, it is possible to see how the sociological concepts of Sartre’s later texts are 
dependent upon his existentialist origins, even if such a claim requires much more argument 
in order to be fully convincing. 
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